Fraudulent property scheme of biblical proportions

A CLASS of British homeowners claims in court that the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ and HSBC Holdings created “a fraudulent property scheme of biblical proportions” that cost people their life’s savings by selling them stolen vacation and retirement properties in Northern Cyprus.

Four dozen plaintiffs filed a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) class action against the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC), HSBC Holdings and HSBC Bank USA.

The plaintiffs say that though the ‘TRNC’ purports itself to be a government, it operates illegally in the Republic of Cyprus through the “brute force” of 40,000 Turkish troops.

“The pattern of racketeering activity engaged in by defendants involves a scheme to fraudulently create a pretence of a legitimate recognized government with sovereign powers such as the ability to own and issue title, create corporations, exercise eminent domain, to commit fraud upon the public and foreign investors while, at every turn, seeking to further the illegal enterprise to avoid justice,” the class claims.

They say the ‘TRNC’ “brutally displaced civilians” from their homes in 1974, a fact that the organization conceals, and sold the displaced people’s properties to the plaintiffs.

According to the complaint, HSBC helped the rogue Turkish force in its racket, which included website operators, Realtors, real estate agents and attorneys.

“HSBC chose to operate in the TRNC illegal enterprise with the TRNC knowing that it was or likely violating the rights of others and/or that the underlying property transaction involving the plaintiffs and members of the class were based on fraudulent or defective title,” the plaintiffs claim.

They say that the ‘TRNC’ “could not exist without the infusion of capital from an international banking and money laundering system like HSBC.”

The class claims the defective title scheme has defrauded foreign investors of billions of dollars.

Recently, a federal judge threw out claims against the ‘TRNC’ filed by pop singer Julio Iglesias, who’d claimed he was duped into agreeing to perform an illegal concert in Cyprus by a military organization.

The plaintiffs want the ‘TRNC’ and HSBC to pay them compensatory and punitive damages for multiple counts of fraud and racketeering. They also want an injunction preventing the ‘TRNC’ from doing business as North Cyprus or the ‘Turkish Republic of North Cyprus’, and from falsely marketing and advertising properties.

First published in the Court House News Service

Further reading

United States District Court for the District of Columbia – Class Action Complaint for Fraud

With value gone out the window, liquidity is the key

HOW much is your house in Cyprus worth? Well, frankly it doesn’t really matter because if you can’t sell it then it’s worth nothing.

Replace the “house” with “collateral” and “you” with “bank” and this little example sums up the situation that many banks find themselves in – holding illiquid assets as collateral.

Are valuers at fault? Well, yes and no. The job of the valuer is to determine the probable transaction price of a property on the day of valuation; not how quickly that can be achieved.

On the other hand, valuers are taking their time in adjusting their valuations to where prices are, mainly due to a lack of comparable transaction evidence.

Lack of transactions means lack of market signals, and thus arbitrary adjustments on the part of valuers or “linking” new valuations to previous ones (in “tech-speak”, autocorrelation).

So how much are valuers off in their valuations? The Property Price Index of Greece’s Central bank shows a decrease in residential property prices of 14% over the past three years.

The Property Price Index of Cyprus’ Central bank shows a decrease in residential property prices of 8.3% over the past two years.

Both indices are based on valuations carried out for collateral purposes. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in both cases the decrease is at least double.

So if valuers aren’t doing their job right, what could they be doing? In some cases the problem lays in not using more advanced methods in carrying out property valuations.

Methods like Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and the Income Method derive their inputs from markets which are continuing to function, e.g. bond market, deposit rates, etc, although they may not show the “pretty picture” that we all like to see.

For example, if the Cyprus government’s five year bond is currently trading at 11.59% why are shops being valued at an initial yield of 6.0%? This yield implies that either valuers expect capital values or rental values to rapidly increase, or that they don’t want to halve the value of the property compared to what it was two years ago.

So with valuations being uncertain at best, what about the actual worth of the property to its owner (or to the bank which is holding it as collateral)?

Assuming that valuers are doing a fantastic job and that they correctly value two properties at €200,000 each, are those two properties of the same quality as collateral? If one is a field in the middle of nowhere and the other a flat in the city centre then the answer becomes a lot more obvious.

Yet banks tend to treat collateral pretty much the same, regardless of its liquidity (which is something not reflected in the asset’s value in any event).

If you think that liquidity doesn’t really matter, read this:

Last week the most expensive house in Ireland was withdrawn from the market, even after reducing its asking price by 75%. The house was bought in 2005 for €58m and was on the market at €15m.

Question – if you can’t sell a property for even a quarter of its acquisition price then what is it worth to you or to your bank?

About the author

Pavlos Loizou MRICS is the lead consultant at Leaf Research.

Leaf Research is a leading real estate consultancy firm, providing high quality real estate market research, valuation, feasibility studies, financial modelling and strategic consultancy.

Now the storm has broken

IN APRIL 2010 asset manager Toscafund issued a discussion paper carrying the title “Storm clouds darkening over Cyprus“. This was not a meteorological warning, but an economic one.

The piece argued that two forces in combination threatened to send the Republic’s economy into a recession as challenging as anything it had faced since the devastation of the 1974 Turkish invasion.

On the one hand we cautioned the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was vulnerable through its varied banking channels to the extremely unpleasant economic events unfolding in Greece. Added to this we warned that frenetic building had led to a significant over-hang of property stock across large swathes of the RoC. We argued the timing of events could not have been worse, with demand sliding precisely when new supply was still increasing.

Our conclusion was as clear as it was stark. We wrote “real estate across the RoC faces further downward price adjustments, possibly a halving in certain areas [and] those who view recent weakness in prices as an opportunity to pick up value will find no shortage of sellers. The market is far from its bottom.”

It is true the RoC’s property market has failed to record the weakness we had warned it would suffer through 2010 and 2011. The fiction of robust pricing can be put down to low transaction volumes.

property owners have delayed selling

Specifically, we are convinced that over much of the period since penning our research, property owners have delayed selling, for fear of what prices they would have to trade at. Low volumes and the resulting lack of pricing visibility has helped banks avoid having to recognise what otherwise would have been severe mark-to-market loan write-downs.

In short, the foreclosure activity we feared would be a feature of 2010 and 2011 has simply been delayed. Indeed, the evidence from the pricing data now being collated by the Central Bank of Cyprus suggests prices are falling gently.

prices could halve in certain tourist areas

As for where the market may bottom, the answer is that peak-to-trough prices could easily halve in certain over-built tourist areas, with property in Nicosia also cheapening by more than owners would feel comfortable believing possible.

In our previous report we visited the issue of where the economy of the RoC was heading. In our assessment we made clear that we saw no chance of any nation departing the eurozone. In the intervening period we have been steadfast in this view and continue to hold it even against the barrage of poorly informed arguments that suggest otherwise.

For all nations across the eurozone, the mechanism through which competitiveness will be re-established will be re-pricing. The simple truth is that wages will fall and asset prices with them, including property.

prices are falling at a quickening pace

Even now with irrefutable evidence that property prices are falling at a quickening pace across the Republic of Cyprus, one senses a sanguine mood that something will soon interrupt the decline.

Some optimists have argued ‘Russian money’ will provide the elixir for RoC’s property market ills. These and others have pointed enthusiastically to the “discovery” of “considerable” gas reserves deep in the RoC’s territorial waters. Still others expect a concerted government fiscal programme to revive the RoC’s economic fortunes.

Indeed, confidence that Moscow will provide assistance has been boosted by news that Cyprus has received the second tranche of a €2.5bn four-and-a-half year, 4.5 per cent loan pledged by Russia, a considerable injection when put alongside the RoC’s fiscal deficit in 2011 of €1.6bn and overall gross debt of close to €10bn.

Should we see Russia as the RoC’s salvation? We believe that even though further “friendly” loans “with no strings attached” from Moscow (to quote from the Cypriot finance minster) are likely to be forthcoming, this will at best ease the economic pain rather than avoid pain altogether.

It is notable that the figure the RoC was hoping for was four times greater than that which was ultimately forthcoming. It should also be remembered Russia extended a loan not a gift, albeit at a rate less onerous than the RoC would have faced in the open sovereign debt market. Why are we so sceptical of a “Russian rescue”?

Cyprus is Russia’s closest ally

There is little doubt that Cyprus is Russia’s closest ally of those countries within the eurozone and amongst its closest of those in the EU. There is also little doubt that economically Russia promises a far stronger outlook than does the EU in aggregate.

However, those expecting Russia or rather Russians to generously bail out Cyprus might like to consider this point. Opportunities exist widely for enriched Russians to spread their wealth, and many of these options are in economies whose currencies are more “affordable” than the euro. Opportunities also exist in markets that offer better value since they never enjoyed the asset price growth seen across the RoC.

asset prices will have to fall significantly

The reality then is that before the RoC can hope to attract further tranches of Russian rescue capital, all asset prices will have to fall significantly as an inducement. In essence, additional Russian rescue capital will arrive into the RoC, but only after the painful correction in asset prices we warn looks certain.

Even if further capital were forthcoming there is the issue of precisely where it might and might not be welcomed across the RoC, and on what terms?

As much as Cypriot property will fall into Russian ownership, one has to question whether it will be allowed to enter as freely into the Cypriot banking sector, neither as deposits nor into their ownership. Much like the hope that oil and gas will prove some magical cure for the RoC’s worsening economic problems, so those expecting a Russian remedy will be disappointed.

It is widely believed Cyprus can “extract” itself from its problems if only it can extract the considerable oil and gas reserves amassed around it. Those rallying around this hope might like to consider two issues. First, the logistical challenges in extracting from contested waters. The second is the time it will take to arrive at a point where the RoC’s sovereign oil and gas extraction is commercially viable.

Let us close this short reprise with lines we ended in our far more extensive piece two years ago.

“The picture we have painted will be seen by enthusiasts for Cyprus as bearing poor resemblance to the robust economy they recognise. They may well defend their case by arguing our negative outlook relies on a number of correlated shocks whose likelihood is far from certain.

“Notable here is a Greek banking crisis; currency collapses across Southern and Eastern Europe and further weakness in the Spanish coastal property market. It is true that were these not to detonate the RoC would avoid the worst of what we have suggested awaits it.

“Economic enthusiasts for the Republic of Cyprus will also be frustrated by our insistence there is little than can be done to forestall events. All this is true. We are wishing no ills on the island, and genuinely hope the dark clouds passing over do not unleash the severe storm they threaten. We are however not confident they will simply pass.”

From the vantage point of May 2012 few can deny that the storm we claimed threatened Cyprus has broken.

About the author

Dr Savvas Savouri is partner, chief economist, and chief investment officer of Toscafund, an established asset manager based in London and Dubai. The firm was founded in 2000 by Martin Hughes and is part of Old Oak Group, a large, well capitalised, financial services business. This includes Cheviot, a private client asset manager and Penta, a private equity business.

Tax incentives expanded and extended

YESTERDAY, the House of Representatives passed a number of tax incentives designed to boost business activity and attract foreign investment to Cyprus.

Changes to the income tax laws concerning the 5% VAT payable on new homes  have been expanded to include non-EU citizens.

Changes to Property Transfer Fees, which came into effect last December for a period of six months, have now been extended until the 31st December 2012.

The changes only apply to the first sale of a property, where the contract is dated and deposited at the Land Registry by the end of the year. Specifically:

  • For those who pay VAT on their house purchase, Property Transfer Fees are waived.
  • For those who do not pay VAT on their purchase, Property Transfer Fees are reduced by 50%.

Property Transfer Fees become payable at the legal completion of a sale and enable the ownership of a property to be transferred from the vendor to the purchaser by the Land Registry.

The tax incentives are designed to boost property sales by reducing the cost of home ownership and stimulate growth in the Cyprus property market.

Fitch places three top banks on rating watch negative

FITCH Ratings has placed Bank of Cyprus, the Cyprus Popular Bank and the Hellenic Bank’s Long-term Issuer Default Ratings and Support Rating Floors of ‘BB+’ and Support Ratings of ‘3’ on Rating Watch Negative.

At the same time, the agency has downgraded the Bank of Cyprus’ and the Hellenic Bank’s Viability Rating to ‘b-‘ from ‘bb-‘ and the Cyprus Popular Bank’s to ‘f’ from ‘b-‘.

Fitch said that the move reflects the fact that Cypriot banks remain highly sensitive to the heightened risks in Greece, in particular if Greece was unable to sustain its membership of Economic and Monetary Union.

In the event that the new general elections scheduled for 17 June fail to produce a government with a mandate to continue with the EU-IMF programme of fiscal austerity and structural reform, an exit of Greece from EMU would be probable and this would likely result in widespread default on private sector as well as sovereign euro-denominated obligations.

The Fitch rating actions came as President Christofias told reporters that he had not ruled out asking for Eurozone bailout funds to help the island’s second-largest bank, the Cyprus Popular.

During an official visit to Austria President Christofias said that the government was seeking ways to “avoid entering the support mechanism. We are in discussions and very soon we must take the final decisions”.

In its announcement, Fitch said that the Cyprus Popular Bank is the most exposed to the Greek debt, with 49% of its total loans at the end of last year, followed by the Bank of Cyprus at 34% and the Hellenic Bank at 17%.

Luxury real estate market resists crisis

Cyprus luxury Real Estate Market
Limassol Marina

DESPITE the general fall in sales and prices of property, the luxury real estate market in Cyprus seems to be weathering the crisis well according to the international property consultancy firm Frank Knight.

In its report “Cyprus Residential Development Prime market report 2012” Frank Knight says that, since the peak of the market, prices in the best second-home locations have held up relatively well, with prices falling by around 20%, while property prices in the secondary and tertiary locations have fallen by around 30% and 40% respectively.

The report points out that values in these second-home markets tend to be more volatile; rising faster in times of prosperity and falling sharper in times of austerity.

However, “Unlike the domestic housing market and the core second-home market, demand for the very top-end of the market has remained strong over the past couple of years”, says the report.

It goes on to say that “Estimates vary, but against a backdrop of falling prices across the country, values across prime markets have generally remained flat over the past two years. However, at some of the very top developments unit prices have risen by around 10% on average.”

According to Frank Knight, demand at prime developments is entirely driven by international buyers. The sub-€500,000 market is dominated by buyers from the UK. In the €500,000-€2m price bracket, the market is made up mainly of Russian and other European buyers, while the very top-end (over €2m) attracts buyers from Russia and other CIS countries.

Further reading

Cyprus Residential Development Prime market report 2012 by Knight Frank Residential Research.