Why hands-on real estate asset management matters

From our experience, the value of any real estate asset – and ultimately the return on investment – is proportional to the amount of attention it will receive and the management practices that you will follow.

In Cyprus, the concept of good asset management practices has yet to enter the mainstream.

Most property owners are under the impression there is nothing to be gained by investing in a property before it is eventually sold – they believe they will still receive the same offers, both in terms of amount and speed.

Most likely, they hold this view because the local real estate market, while a significant sector of the economy, still clings to old-fashioned ideas.

Asset management abroad is considered a necessary practice that maximises property value and increases performance, explaining why so many companies exclusively work in this area.

WiRE FS thinks the time has come to see further developments in this area in Cyprus as well.

This is especially true for now: with banking institutions and real estate asset management companies adding several properties into the market, competition has intensified, becoming increasingly important for properties to stand out.

Good real estate asset management practices

To drive the point home, let’s follow an example of good real estate asset management practices.

We took this project with the end goal to sell an industrial property.

In contrast with the typical process of selling a property in Cyprus, we followed these steps:

  1. We collected and went through every document related to the property, e.g. title deed, planning permit, architectural drawings, etc. As a result, prospective buyers pay attention to due diligence, as it creates a sense of security and professionalism.
  2. We inspected the premises and suggested that the owner undertake all the necessary improvements, such as repairing major damages and sprucing the place up, so the property makes a good first impression.
  3. The next step was to plan a professional photoshoot, both of the premises and the general infrastructure, to draw the attention of prospective buyers when marketing it across various media platforms.
  4. Then, we informed the property owner of the prices that similar properties had fetched and their initial price. Of course, on many occasions, the owner’s valuation of the property delineates from the actual value, but it’s important to have a realistic asking price from the beginning.
  5. We prepared a list with companies in the area that might be interested in the property so that our search to find the right buyer was targeted.
  6. We contacted all potential prospective buyers, informed them about the property and recorded their interest. With the companies that didn’t show any interest, we made sure to record why so that we could go back to the vendor to see if there was anything to amend or improve, e.g. high asking price, needed more documents provided.
  7. At the same time, we prepared a second list with potential buyers based on a potential change of use of the property according to the area’s urban development plan.
  8. We gave detailed, weekly reports to the owner on each stage of the process that we followed.

The process is quite rigid, but we finally found the perfect buyer for the property.

Following these steps, we assisted the property owner, feeling that he did everything in his power to get the best possible price for the property and within a reasonable timeframe.

Property owners who act proactively will have better chances of selling their assets.

In addition, keeping an open line of communication with potential buyers helps them better understand what they want out of a property.

About the Author

Pavlos Loizou, Managing Director, WiRE FS

Paphos marina takes a small step

The Paphos marina project has taken a small step closer to becoming a reality with the Tenders Review Authority’s rejection of an appeal by Ernst and Young Cyprus Ltd against the Contracting Authority (the Deputy Minister of Tourism) in May.

The Authority’s unanimous rejection of the appeal will enable the tender to construct the marina to be awarded to the successful bidder.

The project, at Potima in Kissonerga, will comprise a marina with a capacity of approximately 1,000 vessels, cruise ship docking facilities and more than 42,000m2 of residential and commercial real estate developments.

The successful bidder will develop the marina and operate it on a build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement and will cost approximately €200 million.

It has been more than 3 decades since studies were undertaken for five marinas at Ayia Napa, Limassol, Larnaca, Paralimni and Paphos.

The only one that is fully operational is Limassol, which was fully completed and commissioned in June 2021.

Ayia Napa project is in the final stages of construction.

The initial stage of the Paralimni project, which involves constructing the foundations at sea on which most of the project will be built, will soon be completed.

Contracts were signed for the Larnaca port and marina last year.

The Paphos Marina has been dogged by legal challenges ever since the contract was initially awarded to the Pandora Group (Leptos) in June 2008.

Cyprus failing to comply with EU VAT rules for dwellings

The European Commission has decided to send a letter of formal notice to Cyprus for its failure to properly apply EU VAT rules for dwellings purchased or constructed in Cyprus.

Cyprus allows a reduced rate of VAT of 5% on the first 200m2 of dwellings used as the principal and permanent residence by the beneficiary, without any other limitations. In particular, the reduced rate is applied regardless of the income, assets and economic situation of the beneficiary, the members of the family that will reside in the dwellings, and the maximum total area of the dwellings concerned.

The VAT Directive does allow Member States to apply a reduced rate of VAT on housing as part of a social policy. However, the wide scope of the Cypriot legislation and the lack of limitations therein indicate that the measure goes beyond the objective of a social policy.

Consequently, the Commission considers Cyprus has failed to fulfil its obligations under the VAT Directive. Cyprus now has two months to address the shortcomings identified in this letter of formal notice.

If Cyprus does not take appropriate steps within the next two months, the Commission may decide to send a reasoned opinion.

(In its regular package of infringement decisions, the European Commission pursues legal action against Member States for failing to comply with their obligations under EU law. These decisions, covering various sectors and EU policy areas, aim to ensure the proper application of EU law for the benefit of citizens and businesses.

For more information on the EU infringement procedure, see the full Q&A. For more detail on all decisions taken, consult the infringement decisions’ register.)

Further reading

European Commission infringement decisions 15 July 2021

Building of 955 new homes authorised in Cyprus

April 2021 saw another surge in the planned number of new homes to be built in Cyprus according to the building permit statistics published by the Statistical Service.

During April a total of 627 building permits were authorised by the municipal authorities and the district administration offices in Cyprus; an increase of 221.5% compared to the 195 authorised in April 2020.

The total value of these permits reached €230.6 million and their total area 192.9 thousand square meters and provided for the construction of 955 new homes.

These increases come as no surprise as the construction industry was suffering from the COVID-19 containment measures in April 2020, which resulted in a 62.5% fall in the number of permits issued.

The 627 building permits were authorised for the following:

  • Residential buildings – 441 (+202.1% compared to April 2020)
  • Non-residential buildings – 92 (+360.1% compared to April 2020)
  • Civil engineering projects – 44 (+226.7% compared to April 2020)
  • Division of plots of land – 38 (+171.4% compared to April 2020)
  • Road construction – 1 (+300.0% compared to April 2020)

Building permits for new homes

The 441 residential permits provided for the construction of 995 new homes, comprising:

  • Single houses – 280 (+324.2% compared to March 2020)
  • Buildings comprising 2 units – 74 (+68.2% compared to March 2020)
  • Residential Apartment blocks – 572 (+155.4% compared to March 2020)
  • Residential/Commercial apartment blocks – 29 (+480.0% compared to March 2020)

Building Permits Issued for the Construction of New Homes
(Number of Dwellings)

Month 2020 (Dwellings) 2021 (Dwellings) Increase/Decrease %age Change
January 696 702 6 0.9%
February 680 663 -17 -2.5%
March 524 1,033 509 97.1%
April 339 955 616 181.7%
Totals 2,239 3,353 1114 48.9%

Annual construction figures

During the first four months of 2021, 2,524 building permits were issued compared to 1,721 in the same period last year; an increase of 46.7%. Their total value rose by 34.2%, their total area by 36.0% and the number of new homes by 49.9%.

The construction of 3,353 the new homes for which building permits were authorised during the first four months of 2021, provided for the construction 1,156 new homes in Nicosia, 1,177 in Limassol, 612 in Larnaca, 309 in Paphos and 99 in Famagusta; an overall increase of 49.8% compared to the first four months of 2020.

Further reading

CYSTAT press release: Building Permits April 2021

Living in a Cyprus kleptocracy

Soon after the report on the ‘citizenship by investment’ scheme, fellow economist George Koumoullis convincingly made the case that Cyprus is a kleptocracy – a system of government in which political leaders use their positions to enhance their personal wealth.

As it is now known, the government completely ignored legal opinions provided in 2015 and 2016 by the Attorney General, which stipulated that granting citizenship to members of an investor’s family was unlawful.

The report provided plenty of evidence the government was more interested in maximising passport sales than operating within the law – several government members, including the President, benefited directly from the scheme in that their immediate family members were earning large sums of money either by representing applicants or selling property to them.

As if that was not enough, Koumoullis reminded us of the Archbishop’s admission to local media that he told President Anastasiades: “We must stop stealing, and I include myself”.

The Archbishop accepted a contribution of €300,000 for the Church and €10,000 in his personal bank account from the fugitive JhoTaek Low, the main culprit in the infamous 1MDB scandal in Malaysia, for his efforts in persuading the government to grant him Cyprus citizenship.

Anastasiades and his ministers didn’t bother to declare an interest when approving citizenship applications submitted by their respective family law firms.

Collectively, they behaved as if they were entitled to take advantage of their positions to become richer.

In any democracy that respects the rule of law, such scandals would, by now, have led not only to the resignation or dismissal of the government but also to criminal charges against the President and those ministers who benefited from passport applications.

In Cyprus, however, all it took to close the matter was a half-hearted public apology by the President, who claimed there was no fraud or embezzlement of funds.

Under his presidency, the Citizenship by Investment scheme was adapted in ways that created more lucrative benefits for his family – there are suggestions this sum could exceed €300 million – was neither here nor there.

Unfortunately, checks and balances on the power of the President in Cyprus are few and far between.

It is another side-effect of the Cyprus problem remaining unresolved.

The 1960 constitution gave those checks and balances to the Turkish-Cypriot community – as a result, they remain inoperative since 1963.

Although there have been abuses of power in the past, none has been more embarrassing for the country than the sales of golden passports.

Besides the well-known Al-Jazeera documentary that exposed how corrupt Cyprus is to the rest of the world, the country is now officially accused by the European Commission – alongside Malta – that it has failed to uphold its Treaty obligation of “sincere cooperation” with other EU member states.

For, after all, Cyprus wasn’t just selling Cyprus passports – it was selling EU citizenship to the world’s most notorious white-collar criminals, dictators, and shady oligarchs.

The Commission warned the government repeatedly about the scheme’s infringement on EU values – starting in 2015.

The government simply ignored those warnings.

The economic consequences of kleptocracy are severe.

Almost by definition, kleptocracy impoverishes a nation.

If a state’s priorities are to enrich those in power, economic growth, if it happens at all, will deliver benefits to the few, often at the expense of the many.

Large sections of the population will remain poor.

The young will be disillusioned, and there will be significant misallocation of talent and brain drain, making sustainable economic growth and prosperity for the many a distant dream.

In the case of golden passports, those who benefited were the real estate professionals (including the President’s son in law), law and accountancy firms acting as agents for the applicants (including the one that carries the President’s name and is owned by his daughters).

Cyprus property bust-boom

The economic consequences of the property boom and bust associated with the golden passports scheme are, however, evident already and are paid by the rest of society: rented properties became prohibitively expensive during the boom, while during the bust, the entire property market will feel the ripple effects of unsold overpriced properties intended for ‘investors’.

The same is true of the environmental consequences of the skyscrapers that made the scheme so lucrative for the kleptocrats, which will be felt for many decades to come.

The long list of economic bads also includes the diversion of scarce resources from productive uses into property speculation – including the misallocation of talent, whereby the best brains are attracted to unsustainable activities.

The pursuit of the most lucrative customers of golden passports typically involved attracting white-collar criminals – those who are willing to pay more for a new nationality have made their money illicitly and are eager to avoid legal repercussions, like Jho Low.

We must also add the negative psychological effects on the younger generation and the brain drain that such effects often lead to a long list of bads.

When new entrants to the labour force realise their education and skills are less important in the labour market than their contacts with those in power, they become disillusioned and unmotivated, often becoming economic migrants, helping other countries grow.

Last but not least, the reputational damage to the country’s name deters real investors, who do not want to link their names with a kleptocratic regime of money launderers.

This is indeed a lesson that should have been learned from the 2012-13 crisis.

As I explained in my book “A diary of the euro crisis in Cyprus“, – the country should have learnt a long time ago who were the real culprits of that crisis.

Surprise, surprise, they are the same lot who are responsible for the golden passports scandal!

The same law and accountancy firms went out of their way to attract illicit money and shady foreign oligarchs into Cyprus.

The doubling of the Cypriot banking system during 2005-10 and the associated credit boom in that period, which fuelled another property bubble back then, was entirely the result of the very large inflows of illicit foreign funds.

The reckless investments in Greek government bonds at the height of the Greek crisis by the big two, which eventually triggered the Cyprus crisis, were nothing but a gamble for resurrection, an attempt to replace income from reckless lending that went sour.

Had Cyprus learnt its lesson a lot earlier, as it should, the kleptocrats would have lost power some time ago.

And we probably would have already reached a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem when Mustafa Akinci was in power.

I am, however, optimistic that Cyprus will finally learn the right lessons from the golden passport scheme.

History teaches us that although kleptocracies may survive a few years, they sooner or later come down, usually with a big bang.

Panicos Demetriades is Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Leicester, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences of the United Kingdom. ECB Governing Council Member and Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus from May 2012 to April 2014.

Cyprus only EU state with falling house prices

Cyprus was the only EU member state that experienced a fall in annual house prices during the first quarter of 2021 and only one of three that experienced a quarterly fall, according to Eurostat.

Annual house prices in the EU member states rose by an average of 6.1% compared with the same quarter in 2020. Eurostat reports that this is the highest annual increase for the euro area since the fourth quarter of 2006, and since the third quarter of 2007 for the EU.

Member States for which data are available, the highest annual increases in house prices in the first quarter of 2021 were recorded in Luxembourg (+17.0%), Denmark (+15.3%), Lithuania (+12.0%), Czechia (+11.9%) and the Netherlands (+11.3%), while prices fell only in Cyprus (-5.8%).

For Cyprus, this represents the largest annual fall since the first quarter of 2014, in the wake of the collapse of the island’s economy in 2013.

Compared with the fourth quarter of 2020, house prices in EU member states rose during the first quarter of 2021 by an average of 1.7%. Cyprus recorded the highest fall amongst the three states where the price of houses fell.

Compared with the previous quarter, the highest increases were recorded in Estonia (+6.6%), Denmark (+5.8%) and Lithuania (+5.0%), while decreases were observed only in Cyprus (-5.8%), Malta (-1.6%) and Slovakia (-1.2%).

The House Prices Index

The House Price Index (HPI) measures the price changes of all residential properties purchased by households (flats, detached houses, terraced houses, etc.), both newly built and existing, independently of their final use and independently of their previous owners.

Further reading

Eurostat euroindicators 79/21 – 8 July 2021